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The question of hospitality and of the wel-
coming of otherness is central to the thought of
Emmanuel Levinas. In his Adieu to Emmanuel
Levinas, Jacques Derrida highlights the pri-
mordial role of the concept of hospitality in the
philosophy of Levinas and goes as far as to call
Levinas’s Totality and Infinity “an immense
treatise of hospitality.1 And indeed, numerous
commentators have discussed this dimension
of hospitality in the thought of Levinas.2 Few,
however, have explored the exilic structure
particular to that hospitality and that welcom-
ing. And although many commentators have
explored dimensions of exile in Levinas’ phi-
losophy–pertaining to his biography,3 his
style,4 his vocabulary5—none has, to my
knowledge, attempted to show the centrality of
the concept of exile in the totality of Levinas’s
work, as well as the fundamental role this con-
cept plays in articulating the structure of the
hospitality of otherness. It is my thesis, how-
ever, that the philosophy of hospitality worked
out in Levinas’thought is intimately connected
to exile. While the theme of hospitality perme-
ates the work of Levinas, it is articulated, at ev-
ery step, in relation to the concept of exile. My
goal in this essay will be to show this centrality
of the concept of exile in Levinas, as well as
how this concept illuminates the Levinassian
thematic of hospitality.
We can distinguish two main trends in
Levinas’treatment of exile. The first deals with
the exile of the face with regard to the world of
objects constituted by the self. According to
Levinas, the face of the other is not another ob-
ject in the world which the self can compre-
hend and dispose of at will. On the contrary,
the face escapes all attempts by the self to
grasp or objectify it, thus remaining exiled
from its world. But this exile raises a number
of questions. Must not the face be at some
point be grasped as an object if a relationship
with it is to be possible? If the face escapes all
attempts on the part of the self to constitute it
into an object of the world, if the face refuses to
be encountered within the world of the self,
how is an approach of the face to ever take
place? An approach to the face is possible, ac-
cording to Levinas, only at the price of a pro-
found transformation of the structures of the
self. The self must itself experience exile—a
de-centering, a de-positing of itself as center of
the universe—if an encounter with the exilic
dimension of the other is to be possible. The
approach to the face is thus itself structured as
an exile, as a movement of the self outside of it-
self, outside of its situation as origin and foun-
dation, into the realm of otherness. This is the
second sense of exile in Levinas’s work. But
this exile also raises a number of questions.
How can one account for this sudden shift in
the structures of the self—of a self understood
as the origin of the world to a self exiled, torn
from its own world towards the other? What
provokes this exile? And what’s more, how can
such an exile lead to hospitality? It is difficult
to see how an exiled self, torn from its world,
could become a source of hospitality.
It is these two problems that I want to ad-
dress in this article: How is a hospitality of the
exiled face possible and how can an exiled self
offer such a hospitality? In both cases, the con-
dition of exile seems to be the very antithesis of
hospitality. It is difficult to see how the face
which resolutely remains exiled with regards
the structures of the self could ever lend itself
to hospitality. It is also difficult to see how a
self, itself exiled, could ever be capable of hos-
pitality. In this essay I shall first deal with the
problem posed by the exile of the face and after
that with the problem posed by the exile of the
self in an attempt to show how, ultimately, ex-
ile constitutes the very structure of hospitality
of the face.
The Exile of the Face
The exile of the face is described by Levinas
in a key passage in Totality and Infinity
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which reads as follows:
The epiphany of the face qua face opens human-
ity. The face in its nakedness as a face presents
to me the destitution of the poor one and the
stranger; but this poverty and exile which ap-
peal to my powers, address me, do not deliver
themselves over to these powers as givens, re-
main the expression of the face.6
This passage has layers of meaning and I shall
endeavor to uncover each one throughout this
essay. One of these meanings is that of an exile
of the other from the world of the self, from the
constituted world of perceptions and concep-
tualizations of the self. The other does not “de-
liver” himself or herself to the cognitive and
perceptive powers of the self. The other re-
mains in exile (ex-sul): outside (ex-) of the
world (sul) constituted by the self. There is al-
ways something within the face of the other
which escapes cognition, which escapes our
vision, our understanding. While the face of
the other does lend itself to vision and to a lim-
ited understanding of its features and expres-
sions, there is something within its appearing
that escapes, that refuses to appear. Levinas
observes that “the transcendence of the face is
at the same time its absence from this world
into which it enters, the exiling of a being” (TI
75).
But this phenomenology of otherness raises
an important question: How is the other to ap-
pear outside of the world of objects. If there is
to be appearance, must it not always be within
a world, within a field of vision, of percep-
tion?7 How can something appear outside of
the world of light, outside of the world of visi-
ble objects? How can something appear in the
world and yet present itself as an absence?
These are precisely Derrida’s objections to
Levinas’s descriptions of the exilic character
of the face. For the self to enter into a relation-
ship with the face, it is necessary, according to
Derrida, that the latter manifests itself, exposes
itself to the objectifying activity of the self, lets
itself be seen in the context of a world:
My world is the opening in which all experience
occurs, including, as the experience par excel-
lence, that which is transcendence toward the
Other as such. Nothing can appear outside of
my appartenance to “my world” for an “I am.”
Whether it is suitable or not, whether it appears
to me monstrous (due to whatever prejudices)
or not, I must stand firm before the primordial
fact, from which I cannot turn my glance for an
instant, as a philosopher.8
According to Derrida, it is impossible to speak
of a relationship with alterity without such an
original moment of “violence” by which this
alterity lets itself be encompassed within my
world, “shows itself” to the self:
If light is the element of violence, one must
combat light with a certain other light, in order
to avoid the worst violence, the violence of the
night which precedes or represses discourse. . . .
The philosopher . . . must speak and write within
this war of light, a war in which he always al-
ready knows himself to be engaged; a war
which he knows is inescapable, except by deny-
ing discourse, that is by risking the worst vio-
lence.9
There must be a presentation, a phenomenali-
zation of the face in my world for a relation-
ship to be possible. How can we then speak,
with Levinas, of a relation with the face with-
out prior vision of that face?
Levinas explains this paradoxical way of
manifestation by having recourse to the con-
cept of “nakedness.” The other appears in my
field of vision, as physical body, as a face rich
in features and expressions. And yet some-
thing of that other escapes me. I perceive, con-
stitute the other as a body within my world, and
yet, along with this body, I sense that some-
thing in that other escapes me, I sense that I can
never gain full knowledge of him or her.
Levinas speaks of this mystery or secret of the
other in terms of the “nakedness” of the other:
The nakedness of the face is not what is pre-
sented to me because I disclose it, what would
therefore be presented to me, to my powers, to
my eyes, to my perceptions, in a light exterior to
it. (TI 75)
For Levinas, nakedness is used metaphorically
to describe that part of the other that escapes
the visible “exteriority” of the world. Naked-
ness must be understood in Levinas as that
which remains hidden within the visible world
of things, sceneries, and institutions. Naked-
ness, can never be disclosed within the world
of the self and, in this sense, it reveals an exilic
dimension.10 The other remains exterior (ex-)
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from my world (sul). It is in this sense that
Levinas speaks of the other as the “stranger”
who is “not wholly in my site” (TI 39). Levinas
speaks of this infinite transcendence of the
other as “infinitely transcendent, infinitely
foreign” (TI 194). The nakedness of the other
speaks thus of his or her exile from the objec-
tive and discovered world originating from the
self; it remains exiled from the world of the
self.
But if the nakedness and mystery of the
other remains forever inaccessible to vision
and understanding of the self, how is a genuine
encounter with the other qua other at all possi-
ble? How do we encounter the other beyond
appearances? How may we access the genuine
self of the other? If all of our attempts to under-
stand the other in effect distanciate us from this
other, how are we to approach this other in a
way that will allow us to have a genuine en-
counter with him or her? According to
Levinas, there is another way to relate to other-
ness which does not pass by cognition but
which allows for a genuine encounter with that
other. While the face will not be approached on
the cognitive level, it is nevertheless possible
to approach it, according to Levinas, on the
sensible level. To try to encounter the other on
a cognitive level is bound to fail for Levinas
because the other always escapes the mastery
of the self. Yet, it is possible, according to
Levinas, to encounter this other from the
standpoint of the sensible world.11 The sensi-
ble dimension thus becomes the lieu of “prox-
imity,” of what Levinas terms a genuine en-
counter with the other qua other:
The sensible is superficial only in its role being
cognition. In the ethical relationship with the
real, that is, in the relationship of proximity
which the sensible establishes, the essential is
committed.12
For Levinas, the sensible is the context of the
ethical, the support of the ethical. But does one
not immediately grasp this connection be-
tween the sensible dimension and the ethical?
How does the sensible constitute the medium
wherein an ethical relationship is susceptible
of taking place? How does the sensible consti-
tute a better context to an approach of the exilic
dimension of the face? Why is the standpoint
of the sensible better than that of the cognitive
world to approach otherness? And, what is this
standpoint? Before we can understand the way
the other appears within that sensible world,
we must first understand what Levinas means
by sensible world.
Before we perceive objects and turn our in-
terest to understanding the world around us,
our experience of the world is, according to
Levinas, a sensible one.13 Before all cognitive
attempts to give meaning to the world, we ex-
perience this very world as already given and
as a source of enjoyment. Before we see the
world as a multiplicity of objects, we “live
from” the world, “we live from ‘good soup,’
air, light, spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, etc.
...These are not objects of representations. We
live from them” (TI 110). Before endeavoring
to understand the molecular structure of living
things, or the physical properties of light, be-
fore we even come to terms with the things in
the world as “objects” distinct from ourselves,
we live from them, we experience their effect
on us, we enjoy them. This, according to
Levinas, is a sensible way of relating to the
world. This sensible way comes before and in-
dependently of any cognitive and conceptual
understanding of the world. It is pre-concep-
tual and pre-cognitive.
The sensible world is thus an experience of
otherness which does not pass through an act
of mastery on the part of the self. Moreover, the
experience of the sensible world precedes any
act of mastery or power on the part of the self
and affects this self before any act of constitu-
tion or mastery on its part. In that sense, the act
of “living from . . .” can be understood as con-
stituting an experience of genuine otherness,
of an otherness which will not be derived from
a cognitive action from the part of the self, but
which precedes and affects the self. The expe-
riences of feeling the warmth of the sunlight on
one’s skin or of desiring a fruit and tasting it are
all experiences which offer themselves to the
self before any initiative on its part—they sur-
prise the self, they affect the self. “Living from
. . .” thus can be understood as the first awaken-
ing of the self to a dimension outside of itself.
It is in this sense that for Levinas, the experi-
ence of enjoyment paves the way to the en-
counter with genuine otherness. Enjoyment,
because it precedes the self’s activities and
awakens it to otherness, can thus be under-
stood as one of the modes of “proximity,” of an
approach to genuine otherness.14
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Yet, this conception of enjoyment as signi-
fying transcendence becomes problematic
upon closer analysis, when one realizes that,
while the movement of enjoyment does allow
for an experience of an otherness preceding all
initiatives of the self, it ultimately re-absorbs
this otherness into the self in a movement of as-
similation and appropriation. In the act of en-
joyment, the “exteriority” of life is ultimately
assimilated, repatriated to the self and this is
so, in spite of its obvious external character.
The tasting of a fruit or the sensation of sun-
light are reduced to experiences of the self.
They remain pure sensations of the self. And
indeed, enjoyment is without object; it is not
worried about that which it is the enjoyment
of:
To sense is precisely to be sincerely content
with what is sensed, to enjoy, to refuse the un-
conscious prolongations, to be thoughtless, that
is, without ulterior motives, unequivocal, to
break with all the implications. (TI 138–39)
The enjoyment of a given sensation occurs be-
fore any synthesis, before any objective preoc-
cupation with the object of that sensation. En-
joyment is not worried about the objective
support of the qualities, of the sensations it is
enjoying; it does not aim at the felt but at the
feeling.
One comes thus to wonder how enjoyment,
inasmuch as it is preoccupied with the feeling
over the felt, truly constitutes a movement of
transcendence on the part of the self. If enjoy-
ment does not prolong its sensation into an ob-
ject, into an entity exterior to itself, how then
does it transcend itself? Does not enjoyment
then become a mere subjective experience
which never leaves the immanent sphere of the
ego cogito? One cannot speak in terms of a true
opening of transcendence inasmuch as “the
self sufficiency of the enjoying measures the
egoism or the ipseity of the Ego and the same.
Enjoyment is a withdrawal into oneself, an in-
volution” (TI 118). Far from constituting a
transcendent dimension with regards to the
self, enjoyment constitutes the world as
“mine.” The self that enjoys is “at home” in the
world:
The world, foreign and hostile, should, in good
logic, alter the I. But the true and primordial re-
lation between them, and that in which the I is
revealed precisely and preeminently the same,
is produced as a sojourn in the world, the way of
the I against the “other” of the world consists in
sojourning in identifying oneself by existing
there at home with oneself. (TI 37)
In the world which emerges from enjoyment,
beings have meaning, definition only with re-
gards to myself. While the movement of en-
joyment implies an experience which precedes
all cognitive action on the part of the self, it
nevertheless ends up making sense of the
world as belonging to the self, as “mine”. Ac-
cording to Levinas, “an energy that is other . . .
becomes in enjoyment my own energy, my
strength” (TI 111; my italics). Thus the world
is no more characterized as a dimension exist-
ing objectively and distinctly from the self, but
as existing for the self. As Levinas observes,
“the world is for me” (TI 137).
One can however wonder how a relation-
ship with the alterity of the other is possible in
a context where everything is mine. Can other-
ness subsist in a world where everything is
mine? Can there be an other in such a world?
Levinas himself defines enjoyment as a total
ignorance of the dimension of the other:
In enjoyment I am absolutely for myself. Egoist
without reference to the Other, I am alone with-
out solitude, innocently egoist and alone. Not
against the Others, not ‘as for me’–but entirely
deaf to the Other, outside of all communication
and all refusal to communicate–without ears
like a hungry stomach. (TI 134)
How then can the dimension of the other ap-
pear within the sensible world? One does not at
this point understand how the sensible world
can possibly constitute the lieu of an encounter
with otherness.
The other nevertheless manifests himself or
herself in such a world; but he or she does so as
exiled. This exile is not, however, the cognitive
exile of a face which refuses to be grasped or
understood. The exile of the face takes on a
whole new meaning in the context of the sensi-
ble world of possessions. In such a world, the
exile of the face takes on a much more concrete
meaning and is experienced by the other as the
exile of destitution and poverty. We must now
understand in a totally different way the exile
of the face encountered in the passage studied
above:
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The face in its nakedness as a face presents to
me the destitution of the poor one and the
stranger; but this poverty and exile which ap-
peal to my powers, address me, do not deliver
themselves to these powers as givens, remain
the expression of the face. (TI 213)
And indeed, in such a world—where every-
thing is mine—the other can only appear as the
destitute! There is no room in such a world for
him or her. In a world defined wholly as mine,
the other can only remain exiled. In a world
where everything is my possession, there ap-
pears a being, which not only will not be pos-
sessed—at least on a cognitive level—but
which presents himself or herself as the dis-
possessed—in that it is exiled from my “at
home,” it possesses nothing in a world where
everything is mine. In a world possessed by the
self and where the self is at home, the other can
only appear as destitute, as not-at-home in that
world, as exiled from that world. But if the
other again presents him- or herself as exiled,
as remaining on the margins of my world, how
is the self to encounter him or her? What en-
counter is possible in a world where the other
finds himself or herself marginalized, exiled,
expulsed?
According to Levinas, an encounter is pos-
sible on the sensible level with the exiled other
inasmuch as it profoundly differs from the
cognitive relationship with the face. Whereas
the cognitive exile of the face constituted an
absence of the face, an escape of the face from
the cognitive grasp of the self, the sensible ex-
ile has a wholly different structure: It does not
withdraw from the self, but affects it. In fact,
there can be no escaping this effect of the desti-
tute other on the self, there is no choice in the
matter. But the face does not directly affect the
self, rather it affects it indirectly by affecting
its relationship with the world, a relationship
which Levinas characterizes, prior to the intru-
sion of the face, as innocent and happy. Indeed,
before the intrusion of the destitute face, the
self’s relationship with the world is that of
“happiness”:
Life is love of life, a relation with contents that
are not my being but more dear than my being:
thinking, eating, sleeping, reading, working,
warming oneself in the sun . . . the reality of life
is already on the level of happiness. . . . The final
relation is enjoyment, happiness. (TI 112–13)
This happiness is, furthermore, experienced
by the self as innocent:
In enjoyment, I am absolutely for myself. Ego-
ist without reference to the Other, I am alone
without solitude, innocently egoist and alone.
Not against the Others, not “as for me . . .”—but
entirely deaf to the Other, outside of all commu-
nication and all refusal to communicate–with-
out ears, like a hungry stomach. (TI 134)
Before the intrusion of the destitute and exiled
other, the whole world is mine to possess, and
my possession is innocent—that is, it doesn’t
hurt anyone, it doesn’t constitute a danger to
others.
Everything changes, however, upon the in-
trusion of the destitute and exiled other. With
the intrusion of the other, my relationship with
the world as possession and mineness be-
comes, all of a sudden, problematic:
Neither possession nor the unity of number nor
the unity of concepts link me to the Stranger, the
Stranger who disturbs the being at home with
oneself. (TI 38)
The other casts a shadow upon that relation-
ship of possession, his/her presence problem-
atizes this relationship. Yet, at no point, does
the other threaten my relationship of posses-
sion. Levinas is not here recapitulating the
Sartrean descriptions of the phenomenaliza-
tion of the other. Like Levinas, Sartre hinges
the manifestation of the other on my relation-
ship with the world.15 And just like Levinas,
the Sartrean other problematizes that relation-
ship. But unlike Levinas, Sartre sees the intru-
sion of the other in the world of the self as, in
effect, stealing the world from the self, as op-
erating a shift in its ownership from the self to
the other:
Perceiving him as a man, on the other hand is
not to apprehend an additive relation between
the chair and him; it is to register an organiza-
tion without distance of the things in my uni-
verse around that privileged object. To be sure,
the lawn remains two yards away from him, but
it is also a lawn bound to him in a relation which
at once both transcends distance and contains it
. . . we are dealing with a relation. . . . Inside of
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which there unfolds a spatiality which is not my
spatiality, for instead of a grouping toward me
of the objects, there is now an orientation which
flees from me.16
For Sartre, then, the other appears as other in
my world, not due to a particular way this other
presents him or herself to the self, but in the
way in which it impacts my relationship with
the world. Whereas, before the intrusion of the
other, the world was organized and grouped
towards me as objects for me, for my own con-
sciousness, the intrusion of the other reorga-
nizes the world around a new point of con-
sciousness—that of the other. The world
“flees” from me and manifests itself as also
constituting the world of the other, as also be-
longing to him or her. The other, in effect,
steals the world from the self. The self sees it-
self, through the intrusion of the other as de-
posited from its prerogative as center and sole
possessor of the world. The self, in Sartre’s
terms, is “decentralized.”17 Levinas’s descrip-
tion of the intrusion of the other follows along
those lines, yet without ever constituting a
threat to the self.
According to Levinas, the other does not
steal the world, thus becoming, through a vio-
lent act, co-possessor of my world. The other
only casts a shadow on my possession, without
ever losing his or her exilic and destitute char-
acter. The other never appropriates my world
from me. He or she remains on the margins, on
the edges of that world in his or her destitution.
What he or she does do is transform my inno-
cent possession into a problem. The joyous
possession of the world by the self is pro-
foundly altered by the intrusion, in that world,
of the dispossessed. All of a sudden, the self re-
alizes that its possession of the world in fact
dispossesses the other. The self realizes that it
is at the origin of the very exile of the other. In a
world where everything is mine, what could
possibly belong to the other? In such a world,
the other can only shiver, hunger, and thirst, as
nothing belongs to him or her—he or she is not
at home in such a world, cannot survive in such
a world. That the other cannot survive in a
world defined as mine now casts a huge
shadow on the innocent possession of the
world: That possession now is experienced by
the self to be at the very root of the other’s suf-
fering. The self’s innocent enjoyment of life is
now experienced as the usurpation of the other,
as a threat to his or her own life and existence,
as the very source of the other’s exile and desti-
tution.18
The Exile of the Self
The intrusion of the exiled other thus pro-
foundly alters the self’s happy immersion in
the world, calling it into question:
A calling into question of the same—which
cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of
the same–is brought about by the other. We
name this calling into question of my spontane-
ity by the presence of the Other ethics. The
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the
I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is pre-
cisely accomplished as a calling into question
of my spontaneity, as ethics. (TI 43)
The self is, upon the intrusion of the face,
called out of its innocent enjoyment and forced
to face the suffering of the other and its own re-
sponsibility in that suffering. This “calling
out” of the self from the world by the other is
not unlike Heidegger’s own rendition of the
self’s emergence from the world. Just like in
Levinas, the Heideggerian self or Dasein, is
primordially immersed in the world, albeit not
of enjoyment, but of material things (Sei-
endes). Thus, according to Heidegger, Dasein
lives first and foremost in a preoccupation for
material things that make up the routine exis-
tence of its life. There is no awareness at that
point of any reality or concern outside that
daily preoccupation for the material things of
the world. There is one event, however, which
will call into question this daily routine: It is
the intrusion, in Dasein’s world, of the event of
death. This event forever changes the way
Dasein relates to the world of beings and re-
veals the intrinsic precariousness of Dasein’s
being-in-the-world. Dasein realizes, upon en-
countering death, that its own being in the
world is fragile and precarious, that it is not at
home in the world, that this world does not
truly hold it or shelter it from annihilation. In
other words, it feels anxious:
In anxiety, one feels “uncanny.”. . . But here
“uncanniness” also means “not-being-at-
home.” . . . As Dasein falls, anxiety brings it
back from its absorption in the “world.” Every-
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day familiarity collapses. Dasein has been indi-
vidualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-
world. Being-in enters into the existential
“mode” of the “not-at-home.” Nothing else is
meant by our talk about “uncanniness.”19
The realization of the inescapable event of
death through anxiety (Angst) is lived by
Dasein as a feeling of uncanniness, of not feel-
ing at home in the world (Unheimlichkeit).
And it is precisely this feeling which will give
birth in Dasein to the higher question of Being,
thus ascribing to it a new destiny—that of be-
coming the guardian of the metaphysical
question of Being.
Levinas’s description of the intrusion of the
other holds similarities with Heidegger’s de-
scription of Dasein’s encounter with death.
Just like Heidegger’s Dasein, Levinas’s self is
primordially immersed in the world of enjoy-
ment. Like in Heidegger, the self is jolted out
of that immersion by the intrusion of an other.
The intrusion of the other is thus comparable to
the intrusion of death in Dasein’s world.
Levinas himself subscribes to that comparison
when he describes the event of the face as tak-
ing place in the shadow of death:
In the being for death of fear I am not faced with
nothingness, but faced with what is against me,
as though murder, rather than being one of the
occasion of dying, were inseparable from the
essence of death, as though the approach of
death remained one of the modalities of the re-
lation with the Other. The violence of death
threatens as a tyranny, as though proceeding
from a foreign will. The order of necessity that
is carried out in death is not like an implacable
law of determinism governing a totality, but is
rather like the alienation of my will by the
Other. (TI 234)
Like death, the other puts the joyous posses-
sion of the self into question and calls it out of
its innocent enjoyment of the world, the self
finds itself expulsed from its immersion in the
world by the other. The other sheds a shadow
on its fundamental relationship of possession,
and hence, on its feeling “at home” in the
world. With the intrusion of the other, the self
realizes that its being “at home” in the world is
profoundly problematic. Indeed, not unlike
Heidegger’s account of death, the other causes
to arise in the self a feeling of uncanniness with
regards to its prior relationship to the world. Its
at-home-ness in the world is, in effect, ruined
by the intrusion of the destitute other.
The intrusion of the other hence has the ef-
fect of expulsing the self out of its being-at-
home in the world. The intrusion of the other
exiles the self from its situation as center and
sole possessor of the universe:
The I approached in responsibility is for-the-
other, is a denuding, an exposure to being af-
fected, a pure susceptiveness. It does not posit
itself, possessing itself and recognizing itself; it
is consumed and delivered over, dislocates it-
self, loses its place, is exiled, relegates itself into
itself, but as though its very skin were still a way
to shelter itself in being, exposed to wounds and
outrage, emptying itself in a no-grounds, to the
point of substituting itself for the other, holding
on to itself only as it were in the trace of its ex-
ile.20
With the intrusion of the destitute other, the
world will never be the same for the self. It will
be forever tainted by the presence of that other.
With this intrusion, the world of the self has
lost its original purity and a shadow is now cast
on every single possession of the self. In such a
world, the self is not at home anymore, it finds
itself a stranger within its own world, it finds
itself expulsed, exiled from its very home. The
question remains, however, as to how this ex-
ile can make way for a hospitality of the other?
How can such a “dislocation”, such a “loss,”
such an “exile” of the self render a welcoming
of the other possible?21
Indeed, this feeling of uncanniness of the
self can often lead to the very opposite of a hos-
pitality. The intrusion of the other in the world
of the self does not necessarily lead to a hospi-
table response on the part of the self. We are re-
minded of the story of Cain, alluded to by
Levinas to that effect:
Why does the other concern me? What is
Hecuba to me? Am I my brother’s keeper?
These questions have meaning only if one has
already supposed that the ego is concerned only
with itself, is only a concern for itself. In this hy-
pothesis it indeed remains incomprehensible
that the absolute outside-of-me, the other,
would concern me.22
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Levinas is here alluding to Cain’s question
“am I my brother’s keeper?” on the aftermath
of his killing his brother Abel. This question is
chilling in its refusal to admit to the other’s
pertinence in the self’s world. In asking this
question, Cain is, in effect, saying: What place
does my brother have in my life? This question
does not however emerge from nothing. There
is an event which precedes this question, and
which gives rise to this question: It is the event
of the intrusion of Abel into the once-very
secure world of Cain.
From the very beginning, in the story of
Cain and Abel, the personality of Cain is de-
scribed as the center of the universe. Even
Cain’s name alludes to his centrality in the
world. The name Cain, qain, is related to the
root qanah,23 which means to possess or to
master and alludes to his eventual working and
settling on the land. Cain is described in the
text as a subjectivity at home in the universe—
the world is his and the land is his. He is the
center of the universe. But there is one event
which will profoundly alter this situation: It is
the event of God’s acceptance of Abel’s offer-
ing over Cain’s. The text does not explicitly
say why Abel’s offering was preferred by God
over Cain’s. But it does describe the traumatic
effect that this event has on Cain. The text de-
scribes his face as “downcast” (Genesis 4:6) in
a way that alludes more to a deep trauma than
to actual anger. And indeed, this event is trau-
matic for Cain because, for the first time in his
life, he is not the center of the universe. All of a
sudden, Cain is not at home in his own world
anymore, he is not the center of the universe
anymore, there is somebody else—and that
somebody else is taking away his very prerog-
ative as sole possessor of the world. One can
thus understand Cain’s burning or pain as an
experience of exile within his own world—he
is expulsed from his world by the intrusion of
Abel, God’s favorite.
This exile experienced by Cain will sadly
not lead to an event of hospitality, but, on the
contrary, to the expulsion of the other out of his
world through an act of murder: “Cain at-
tacked his brother Abel and killed him”(Gene-
sis 4:8). Cain’s exile was too painful for him to
handle. His expulsion from his central position
as sole owner of the world was too much for
him to bear. It is a pain too deep, too personal,
too intimate for him to be able to take. Thus his
exile does not bring about an act of hospitality,
far to the contrary: It leads to the expulsion of
the other from one’s world. How then can we
interpret the exile of the self by the intrusion of
the other as bringing forth a hospitality of that
other. It seems a very unlikely and unnatural
outcome of that exile. Indeed, the natural reac-
tion of a subjectivity expulsed from its world
by the intrusion of the face is to protect its su-
premacy by expulsing violently that other
from its world, either by killing him or her or
by ignoring him or her. The risk of losing one’s
central place in the world is often too hard to
bear. We instinctively feel that by welcoming
the other, our world will never be the same.
Our neighborhoods, our schools, our parks,
our sidewalks will not reflect who we are any-
more, but will become populated by strangers.
To welcome the other into our world is to lose
everything that heretofore constituted and sur-
rounded the self, it is to lose everything that
made us who we are. We instinctively feel that
to welcome the other will amount not only to
losing our world, but ultimately, our identity,
our foothold in life.
According to Levinas, however, while this
murder—either by violence or by a refusal to
acknowledge that other—constitutes a possi-
ble response to the intrusion of the other, it
does not constitute the only response. There is
another response possible, one which hears the
plea of the other and acts upon it through the
courageous act of generosity:
Positively produced as the possession of the
world I can bestow as a gift on the Other, that is,
as a presence before a face. For the presence be-
fore a face, my orientation toward the Other, can
lose the avidity proper to the gaze only by turn-
ing into generosity, incapable of approaching
the other with empty hands. (TI 50)
Why courageous? Because to hear the plea of
the destitute other amounts to recognizing that
the world is not my sole possession, that the
other also has a claim on it too; it is to acknowl-
edge my own exile in the world, my own
home-less-ness within a world which is no
more unquestionably mine, which does not re-
volve around me anymore. Far from signifying
my ownership of the world, generosity testi-
fies to my own homelessness in the world, my
own exile within the world. It is paradoxically
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only when the self realizes, acknowledges its
own exile within the world, its own destitu-
tion, that it becomes capable of generosity.
But while generosity is borne out of the
self’s sense of exile, it, by the same token, pro-
vides the other with a world, with a home.
While, in enjoyment, “things” had meaning
only inasmuch as they related to me, as objects
of desire or possession, as “mine,” the act of
generosity has the effect of giving a whole new
meaning to “things”–that of also belonging to
the other, that of also being “his” or “hers”:
Things acquire a rational signification, and not
only one of simple usage, because an other is as-
sociated with my relations with them. In desig-
nating a thing I designate it to the Other. The act
of designating modifies my relation of enjoy-
ment and possession with things, places the
things in the perspective of the Other. (TI 209)
Thus, through the act of generosity, things do
not signify anymore towards a self situated at
the center and origin of the world, but also sig-
nify towards an other. Through the act of gen-
erosity, I allow for the emergence of things out
of my world and towards the other:
Utilizing a sign is therefore not limited to sub-
stituting an indirect relation for the direct rela-
tion with a thing, but permits me to render the
things offerable, detach them from my own us-
age, alienate them, render them exterior. (TI
209)
The act of generosity designates to the other
a world which heretofore was my sole posses-
sion. Through generosity, I give the other a
world. The loss of the world of the self thus
gives rise to a hospitality of the other within
that world. The self’s exile allows for a wel-
coming of the other.
This exile of the self is, in this sense, at the
antipodes of the Sartrean descriptions of the
self’s expulsion from its world upon the intru-
sion of the other. The exile which the move-
ment of generosity assumes does not signify,
as it does for Sartre, the usurpation of the self’s
possession by the other, but the welcoming by
the self of that dimension of otherness. The
other never poses a threat to the self and par-
takes of the world of the self only upon an act
of generosity by the self. Moreover, the act of
generosity does not, as insinuated by Sartre,
constitute a loss for the self—the self loses its
world to the other—but, on the contrary, a
gain. Indeed, while the exile assumed by gen-
erosity dispossesses the self of its at-home-
ness in the world, it does so by opening up,
within that world, the transcendent dimension
of otherness. The dimension of the other is
opened within my “at home” through the
movement of generosity. One can further de-
scribe this exile of the self in generosity as a
contraction of the self permitting the opening,
within the world of the self, of a space for the
other24—that is, a hospitality of the other. The
other could not co-exist with a consciousness
defined as the center of the universe; there is no
place for the other in a world where everything
pertains to consciousness, where conscious-
ness is at the center. It is necessary for the self
to be de-centered, to find itself exiled and to
accept this exile for the other to find a home in
the world, for the other to find a place within
the world. Through the gift of the world to the
other, consciousness deposes itself of the pre-
rogative of center of the universe, but, in so do-
ing, it opens up a space for the other within the
world. The dimension of the face thus can only
enter the world of consciousness–that is, ap-
pear, be manifested in that world–if that con-
sciousness opens up a space for it through the
act of generosity which interrupts its own pos-
sessive grasp of the world.25
Thus, through the moment of generosity,
the world of the self, once entirely organized
around the self, widens to welcome—without
ever possessing him or her—the dimension of
the other. The homeland of the self has now be-
come a haven for the other. The world is no
more the place where the self accumulates its
possessions, but the place of welcoming of the
other: “This book will present subjectivity as
welcoming the Other, as hospitality” (TI 27).
The exile of the self furthermore allows for a
hospitality of the other without ever reducing
that other’s intrinsic exile. The other remains
outside the grasp of consciousness, outside its
mastery and control, yet lets itself be ap-
proached by consciousness through the act of
generosity. The other escapes the self-con-
tained movement of theory, but allows itself to
be approached through the ethical movement
of generosity. It is therefore on the level of eth-
ics that the other can be approached and not on
the level of epistemology. The other always re-
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mains exiled with regards to the world of the-
ory, yet, he or she lets him- or herself be ap-
proached through the welcoming stance of
generosity. Thus the ethical moment of en-
counter of otherness passes through a double-
exile: the exile of the other with regards to the
intentional grasp of consciousness, and the ex-
ile of the self–through generosity—which per-
mits an approach of the other as exiled, yet as
capable of receiving the hospitality of the self.
Exile finds itself at the very core of the ethical
moment in the philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas. One cannot understand the structure
of the ethical encounter without first under-
standing these two moments of exile. For with-
out the first exile, whereby the other remains
out of my grasp, there would be no otherness as
such to serve as my interlocutor. And without
my generous exile towards him or her, there
would be no encounter with that ever-escaping
and exiled other. Exile finds itself not only at
the origin of the subjective awakening of con-
sciousness to the dimension of the other, but
also constitutes the very structure of the
approach of that other, of an ethical relation-
ship between the self and the other.
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